Bronson Frick from ANR

In a whirlwind deal-making frenzy last week, the Virginia Legislature passed the weakest smoking bill in the U.S. since the Surgeon General's Report  -  thanks to the bipartisan support of the Governor, Speaker of the House, and even several health groups (and despite the opposition of some others). 

This industry-driven legislation could have a direct impact on other states in part because of the nationwide (and largely positive) media coverage. The media loves the narrative of Virginia dealing with the smoking issue, but reporters don't want to ruin the story with details about it being a bad bill. (Instead, it's referred to as a "compromise bill" and VA is joining 24 other smokefree states, etc).   Also, because several health groups, such as the Medical Society of Virginia, endorsed this ineffective law, it has additional media traction and a veneer of credibility that opponents can capitalize on.

Here are some clips to illustrate the misleading coverage - and quotes - in the media.  
http://www.timesdispatch.com/rtd/news/state_regional/state_regional_govtpolitics/article/SMOK20_20090219-222415/211191/
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/19/AR2009021901904.html


I would expect opponents to get media clips like these in front of lawmakers in other states or cities (to show lawmakers they can cut a ventilation/preemption/exemption deal and still look good), and for cigarette industry lobbyists to push this model in other states that could be vulnerable.

I encourage advocates to familiarize themselves with this bill, some of the press coverage, and to consider developing talking points for lawmakers, partners or media in your area, and to discuss how to head off similar dealmaking in your state. The bottom line is this is an industry bill straight out of Philip Morris' playbook. It is not based on science or health evidence.  It will not protect health protect of anyone in Virginia. It is designed to institutionalize indoor smoking sections for another generation under the false impression that exemptions and ventilation have somehow solved the problem. 

The key provisions of the legislation are:

1.  smoking will be prohibited in all public restaurants unless the restaurant has a room segregated from the nonsmoking area of the restaurant and ventilated separately so that cigarette smoke can't mingle with air outside the designated smoking area.   (note: this is not actually possible)
 
2.  smoking is permitted in a private club
 
3. smoking on outdoor patios is permitted unless the retractable flaps of the enclosure are closed.
 
4. Workers at restaurants with smoking areas "cannot be compelled to work in the smoking area"  (putting the burden on workers)
 
5. the bill goes into effect on December 1, 2009

7. Leaves preemption in place and does not cover other non-hospitality worksites.  Note: In Virginia,  "restaurant" means bars too since there is not a seperate distinction for restaurant/bar.

 
The following amendments ( that were added on the floor of the House of Delegates) were removed in the final version of the bill:
 
1. Smoking  could be permitted if the entire restaurant is reserved for a private function
 
2. Smoking could be permitted if at any time a restaurant does not permit people under the age of 18 to enter the restaurant


Philip Morris succeeded not only in institutionalizing indoor smoking in Virginia's hospitality venues, but also achieved its goal - as outlined in Project Sunrise - for causing dissent within the public health community - through proactive legislation -  and picking off health groups to support the industry's position.  

Congratulations to the VA affiliates of ACS, AHA, and ALA -  for opposing this bill - and also for their notable success in removing some of the amendments that would have made it even worse.   Unfortunately, this is still the weakest U.S. smoking-related statewide law enacted since the 2006 Surgeon General's Report (even weaker than Pennsylvania's).  This bill was unfortunately supported by the Medical Society of Virginia, the March of Dimes, the Virgina Nurses Association, the Commissioner of Health, and the Governor (who had previously been a championed and vetoed a weak bill in 2007).  For these stakeholders, the goal apparently shifted from a health goal of saving lives to a political goal of "getting something passed." They were unwilling to say NO to a bad bill despite their signed Dealbreakers agreement with the coalition, and despite their awareness of the SGR findings.

Typically, after enactment (but before implementation) of a smoking room law, ventilation and tobacco front groups start making the rounds to hospitality businesses - to spread fear - and urging them to invest money in construction and ventilation systems, saying things like "Your competition is doing it, you'd better too if you want to stay in business).  This ensures that there is a base of businesses that are financially and physically invested in maintaining indoor smoking, making it politically difficult for lawmakers to strengthen the law later.

Post-law evaluation in VA, such IAQ assessment should make clear that the air is not smokefree and the law is not saving lives.  And, hopefully the hospitality sector can be warned to not waste money on walls and ventilation systems, and instead to just go smokefree. And smokefree supporters can regroup and organize to build sufficient public outrage and political will for strengthening the law - as several cities have successfully done.

 
Project Sunrise
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/efg37c00/pdf?search=%22sunrise%20strategy%20ati%22 (see page 10-11. Thanks to Ruth Malone for highlighting this document at the UCSF Tobacco Symposium )

http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/yzf37c00/pdf?search=%22project%20sunrise%20strategy%20ati%22